Two periods of radical political-economic change in the former East Germany illuminate dynamics of organization-environment relationships that generally are hidden from view. Historical, qualitative, and survey data from a longitudinal comparative study of 78 orchestras in four nations show that the contexts of East German orchestras changed significantly when the socialist regime took power after World War 11, and then again in 1990 when that regime fell. Socialist rule only modestly affected orchestras' institutional features, however; they continued to reflect centuries-old German musical traditions. The collapse of socialism in 1990, by contrast, provoked differentiation among orchestras-some adapted successfully to the new political-economic context, but others floundered. Successful adaptation was found to be a joint function of an orchestra's prior strength as an organization and the kinds of leadership initiatives taken by orchestra leaders and players. Overall, the findings suggest that the size and character of environmental effects depend on the degree to which contextual changes alter (a) the strength of the link between organizational actions and resources obtained (resource contingency) and (b) organizations' latitude to manage their own affairs (operational autonomy).
In the decades since Stinchcombe's (1965) landmark statements on the relationship between organizations and their societal contexts, an abundant research and theoretical literature on organization-environment relationships has developed. In this paper, we take a fresh look at those relations in historically unique circumstances-specifically, during the two periods of radical political-economic change that occurred in the former East Germany in the last half-century. The first change took place in the years immediately after World War 11 when the socialist regime took power; the second occurred in 1990 when that regime fell and the German states reunified. Our focal institution is the professional symphony orchestra, which has been integral to East German culture for over a century. By examining the impact of the two revolutionary changes on this deeply rooted cultural institution, we seek to identify and illuminate dynamics of organization-environment relationships that generally are hidden from scholarly view. There is no dearth of conceptual models of organizationenvironment relations (for a brief review, see Allmendinger and Hackman, 1994). Institutional models (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987) describe the processes by which organizations situated in similar environments tend to become isomorphic with those environments, increasingly similar to one another, and persistent over time. Population ecology models (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989 ; Aldrich, 1979) explain how environmental changes reshape the population of organizations in a domain. Over time, organizations that fit well with their environments prosper and reproduce, whereas those that do not eventually die out. In the population ecology view, there is little that organizational actors can do to alter ecological forces or to adapt to them. Adaptation models, such as organization-environment fit environmental change by first disaggregating the problem into three more specific and empirically tractable queries. Then, after we have reported what our data have to say about these questions, we integrate the findings into a new conceptual framework for analyzing how organizations respond to changing environments.
Did regulatory agencies and/or local governments buffer East
German orchestras from the impact of national political and economic changes?
That major political-economic changes occurred in Germany after World War 11 and again in 1990 is evident in the historical record. It does not necessarily follow, however, that those national-level jolts were felt with full force by East German symphony orchestras. Any national regime necessarily implements its social and economic policies through a variety of administrative and regulatory agencies, which form the proximal context of operating organizations (Carroll, Delacroix, and Goodstein, 1988). It is possible for these agencies to absorb the impact of even radical national-level changes, leaving the proximal environment of regulated organizations mostly unchanged (Aldrich, 1979: 196) . We draw on qualitative and historical data to determine whether the proximal environment of East German orchestras actually did change after 1945 or in 1990-or whether mid-range government entities blunted or redirected national policies in ways that preserved orchestras' traditional operating environments.
To what extent, and in what ways, did orchestral functioning and the life and work of orchestra players change in response to the two national-level political-economic changes?
Symphony orchestras in East Germany are strong and deeply rooted cultural institutions. Even if their proximal environments were altered by the two rounds of political-economic changes in that country, institutional forces might have been strong enough for orchestras to weather the changes. If so, we would expect to find orchestras persisting in their traditional ways of operating and few changes in the life and work of orchestra players following the societal-level shocks. Alternatively, the societal changes may have been strong and pervasive enough to overcome inertial forces and recast the very institutional form of the East German symphony orchestra. We draw on quantitative data from orchestras and players to assess empirically what happens when radical political-economic changes collide with strong institutional forces.
What factors distinguish those orchestras that adapted successfully to the potentially threatening political-economic changes in East Germany from those that did not?
A changing external environment always offers the possibility of adaptation in which opportunities for improvement are exploited or, at least, potential negative consequences of the changes are avoided. Some orchestras in East Germany fared better after the dismantling of the socialist state in 1990 than did others. We draw on both quantitative and qualitative data to distinguish between these two groups of orchestras. Specifically, we empirically explore the possibility that successful adaptation depends jointly on (a) an organization's strength prior to the contextual shock and (b) the kinds of leadership initiatives taken by organization managers and members. Trustworthy answers to these three research questions would contribute to sociological knowledge about cultural institutions as well as to organization theory. Although there has been considerable research on how cultural traditions and political-economic factors affect public support for cultural institutions (Blau, 1988 (Blau, , 1989 , less is known about contextual influences on the organizations that actually produce cultural products. Because of the extraordinary variation in the societal context of East German orchestras over the last four decades, East Germany offers a unique setting for assessing factors that affect the viability of cultural organizations. Moreover, because symphony orchestras, relative to other cultural institutions, tend to be insulated from direct political and ideological influence (Shostakovich, 1983) , any findings of effects from political changes are likely to be conservative. Rueschemeyer's (1991) research on East German visual arts and Goldfarb's (1980) study of Polish student theater supplement the results reported here by providing tests of the relation between political systems and more politically sensitive cultural forms.
Research Setting and Strategy
Symphony orchestras. Professional symphony orchestras are defined as ensembles whose primary mission is public performance of those orchestral works generally considered to fall within the standard symphonic repertoire and whose members are compensated nontrivially for their services. Both concert and broadcast orchestras fall within our domain, as do orchestras that perform specialized works such as operas or pops programs in addition to the standard repertoire. Excluded are chamber ensembles, orchestras that perform operatic or theater works exclusively, university orchestras, and amateur orchestras. The core task of symphony orchestras is well defined and similar both within and across nations, in that symphony orchestras around the world play largely the same repertoire with roughly the same number and mix of players. By including in our domain only orchestras that perform the standard symphonic repertoire, most task-based variance is automatically controlled. This reduces the problem, common in comparative research, that differences in tasks or compositionR are confounded with organizational or national contexts.
German orchestras. Orchestral music in Germany has received much public attention and consistent financial support over the last 200 years (Pfannkuch, 1962; Weineck, 1985) . In the eighteenth century, orchestras were supported mainly by the nobility; by the twentieth century, almost all funding was provided by states and municipalities (Becker, 1962; Raynor, 1978) For the first question, on the degree to which mid-range government entities buffered orchestras from the full impact of societal-level changes, we draw mainly on archival and interview data. We document changes in the immediate context of East German orchestras that resulted from the advent of the socialist regime following World War 11 and those that occurred as the events leading to German reunification began to unfold in the late 1980s.
For the second question, on how orchestras and players responded to the societal-level changes, we rely on survey and interview data. To assess the impact of socialism, we draw mainly on survey data collected from members of orchestras in the four countries in our sample as the communist era came to an end in early 1990. If four decades of socialist policies and practices had significantly affected East German orchestras, then the reports of players in those orchestras should differ substantially both from those of their counterparts in West German orchestras (which, during the same historical period, operated in a democracy that became increasingly market-oriented) and from those of musicians in the two English-speaking nations. To assess the impact of the second major political-economic change, we collected an additional wave of survey data in the summer of 1991, after the socialist regime had fallen.
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These data allow us to track directly the impact of this second change on orchestras and players.
For the third question, about the factors that distinguish orchestras that prospered under reunification from those that began to flounder, we rely on survey, interview, and observational data. These data identify certain structural features of orchestras and patterns of behavior by orchestra leaders and members that moderated the impact of reunification on orchestras and players. Throughout, we give special attention to mechanisms that cross levels of analysis-particularly to the interactions among (a) contextual factors (the two political-economic shocks and government policies and practices), (b) organization-level variables (structural features of orchestras), and (c) the behavior and attitudes of individual players and leaders.
METHOD

Selection of Orchestras
The population of symphony orchestras in each of the four countries was enumerated by listing all orchestras that advertised at least one open player position between 1985 and 1989. We obtained the 1989 player salary budget for each of those orchestras and used the distribution of salary budgets to select approximately equal numbers of "major" and "regional" orchestras from each country. Major orchestras were randomly drawn from the top decile (or, in the United Kingdom, which had relatively fewer orchestras, quintile) of the distribution; regional orchestras were randomly drawn from each of the remaining deciles (or quintiles) until we obtained a sample of about 20 orchestras from each country. Of the 81 orchestras invited to participate in the study, 78 agreed (96 percent). One regional orchestra in the United States and one major and one regional orchestra in the United Kingdom declined.
Characteristics of the orchestras in the sample are summarized in Table 1 . A number of differences across nation and orchestra standing (major vs. regional) are evident. Only in the United States do all orchestras perform concerts exclusively. The United Kingdom and the two German nations have several orchestras whose main mission is broadcast performances. Only half of the German orchestras perform concerts exclusively; many also perform for opera and theater productions. As might be expected, given their multiple missions, the mean size of German orchestras is larger than that of orchestras in the two English-speaking countries. Regional orchestras in all countries tend to be more recently founded than major orchestras, to have a larger percentage of women players (especially in the United States and the United Kingdom), and (for East and West Germany only) to have a larger percentage of foreign workers. There are no major differences across nations in player demographics.
Qualitative and Archival Data
Before beginning fieldwork, we studied published information such as orchestra histories, scholarly papers, and newspaper or magazine articles about orchestras in each 342/ASQ, September 1996 We derived sixteen composite measures from the survey items. These were based on the a priori framework used to select and generate items, supplemented by factor analyses of data from 924 respondents and by inspections of item means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations. We retained five single items of special interest, resulting in a total of 21 measures. They are grouped into four domains: (a) organizational features of the orchestra, (b) orchestral process and performance, (c) player motivation and satisfaction, and (d) music director behavior. All measures range from 1 (low) to 7 (high), except for those assessing the behavior of the music director, which range from 1 to 5.
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Symphony Orchestras The measures, grouped by domain, are described in the Appendix. Means, standard deviations, and internal consistency reliabilities are reported in Table 2 . We assessed discriminant validities of the measures by comparing the average intercorrelation among items that make up a given composite score with those items in the same section of the survey that do not contribute to that score (off-diagonal correlations). The median within-composite correlation is .46, compared with a median off-diagonal correlation of .24, which is satisfactory. Three measures have relatively weak discriminant validities: integrity as an ensemble, music director organizational initiatives, and music director coaching.
We compared within-composite, off-diagonal, and between-composite correlations for the 21 measures across countries. Patterns of intercorrelations were quite similar across nations, which provides assurance about the comparability of players' responses to the English and German versions of the instrument and permits use of the same composite scores for all countries (Allmendinger et al., 1993).
Finally, we computed intraclass correlations across orchestras for all survey variables for which players described their orchestra and leaders. All of these correlations were significant, which allowed us to aggregate the responses of players within orchestras to generate organization-level scores for each of these variables (Kenny and LaVoie, 1985 land (Mehner, 1990) . Before the socialist regime came to power, there were 48 orchestras in the geographical area that was to become the East German state. By 1990, East Germany had 76 professional symphony orchestras in a country slightly smaller than the state of Tennessee. There was one symphony orchestra in East Germany for every 220,000 citizens, a higher density than in any other country in the world (Allmendinger and Hackman, 1994). Not all orchestras were created equal, however. Although state policy explicitly promoted the democratization of culture, its implementation resulted in a few world-class ensembles, designated "Class A" orchestras, scattered among a much larger number of "B" and "C" class orchestras. The higher the class, the more fixed positions, the larger the annual budget, and the higher the pay of players. Orchestras could not improve their standing, nor was there any real risk of demotion to a lower class. The state policy of democratizing culture went far beyond simply creating more orchestras. Many orchestras were required to travel to communities that did not have their own, to perform in schools, and to hold concerts in industrial complexes (Kombinate). Moreover, "cultural brigades" were created as an incentive for cultural participation. Members of these self-composed groups engaged in activities consistent with state ideology, including attending concerts and other cultural events, and were rewarded with salary increases.
State policy oriented orchestras almost exclusively toward East German audiences. Few orchestras were allowed to travel outside the country or to produce recordings for international distribution. The government did, however, make sure that the country's very best orchestras received international exposure, which further elaborated the status hierarchy among orchestras. The socialist regime closed all but four of the nation's conservatories, which severely limited the supply of orchestra players and kept orchestra size small-a mean of 63 players compared with 76 in West Germany. Highly qualified musicians were in especially short supply because state policy required that conservatories give preference to applicants from working-class backgrounds rather than admit students strictly on the basis of talent. Over time, musician shortages became so serious that orchestras began to import players from other socialist states. Eventually, even the tradition in German orchestras of all-male players was breached, and women were recruited (Allmendinger and Hackman, 1995). Even so, lower-class orchestras often needed to borrow players from one another to cover all the parts of large-ensemble works.
Control of orchestras. Central planners exercised almost complete control over the administration and economics of East German orchestras. Orchestra names, the composition of their audiences, and even the size of their audiences all were centrally determined. Communist party officials were given subscriptions, for example, whether they wanted them or not. And they were counted as attending the concerts to which they had been subscribed, whether they were actually there or not.
In the early years of the socialist regime, three different state agencies controlled orchestra activities. In 1986, these agencies were merged into the DTO, which assumed responsibility for all aspects of orchestra operations, including artistic policy, personnel matters, and the management of support staff. The centrality of the DTO to the day-to-day operations of orchestras is illustrated by the player selection process. DTO officials auditioned all graduates of the four music schools and assigned each one a technical proficiency score. Orchestras were allowed to consider only musicians whose scores fell within a DTO-specified range. The top-ranked orchestras auditioned and employed the highest-scoring players; lower-ranked orchestras were permitted to consider only players who had received lower scores-if any players at all were available.
Because the wage and price structure of the cultural sector of the economy was artificially stabilized, East German orchestras were protected from international competition and from economic uncertainty. The pay of orchestra musicians, however, was quite low relative to player salaries in other nations. For example, in 1990 a musician in a top-ranked East German orchestra, such as the Berliner Sinfonie Orchester, earned 1,800 marks (roughly $1200) per month, plus a number of state-supplied goods and services; a typical player in the Berliner Philharmonisches Orchester, a top West German orchestra just across the wall, earned more than four times as much. The wage structure within East German orchestras was flat as well. Whereas principal players in Western orchestras typically earn substantially more than do tutti (section) players, all members of a section were paid nearly the same in East German orchestras.
Orchestras' expense budgets were centrally determined and rarely changed from year to year. Overall budgets were partitioned into funds for specific purposes, and orchestra managers had almost no flexibility in using those funds. An orchestra with money in its instrument fund, for example, rarely could purchase instruments manufactured in East Germany because almost all of them were sold to other nations for hard currency. By contrast, funds for instrument repair were relatively easy to spend, prompting orchestras to repair even instruments that could have been more inexpensively replaced.
The East German policy of "bringing music to the people" was not mere propaganda; the socialist musical culture did result in East German citizens having greater access to serious music. In implementing this policy, the government took control of virtually all decisions that were consequential for orchestras and players. 
Conclusion
The answer to our first research question-about whether mid-range government agencies buffered East German symphony orchestras from the two national-level changes-is clearly negative. In the first instance, high-level decision makers eliminated some entities that had been important features of the orchestral context (such as churches) and created new agencies that became highly salient for orchestras (such as the DTO and the Kombinate). The mid-range government agencies that remained in place, such as municipalities, potentially could have buffered orchestras from the full impact of these changes, but they did not. In the second instance, the collapse of the government rendered financially and administratively impotent the very institutions that had become the most consequential features of the orchestral context under socialsm.
The contextual changes were real jolts. They were neither invented by orchestras (Starbuck, 1976 concerned that their orchestras were slipping musically and financially, and there was pervasive unhappiness with pay and job security.
The political-economic system within which East German orchestras operated from 1945 to 1990 did affect orchestra operations and player motivation and satisfaction. Yet the size of these effects is modest for most measures. Clearly, the musical and organizational traditions of East German orchestras were not destroyed by the 45 years of socialist rule.
Orchestras in West Germany also were changing between 1945 and 1990-but in the opposite direction, which should have increased the size of obtained differences between the two nations. Although West German orchestras continued to be supported mainly by the Lander and the cities, the national economic context in which they operated became increasingly capitalist and market oriented. Moreover, satisfactory concert halls were available to all West German orchestras, instruments and music libraries were rarely a problem, and there were both funds and opportunities for international tours by many orchestras. Yet these orchestras also did not stray far from the continental tradition of a state-supported musical culture. Overall, our findings suggest that it was more consequential in 1990 to be a German orchestra than it was to be an orchestra in a socialist nation. Players in 1991 also reported that they now had heightened involvement in their organizations and expanded opportunities for influence and mobility. This is consistent with the movement, observed in many orchestras, for players to take the reins of leadership from those state-appointed officials who previously had held them. Finally, players reported that their orchestras had improved musically between 1990 and 1991. Given that attendance for most East German orchestras was dropping sharply in the early months of 1991, this finding is unexpected. Yet the people who now were attending concerts were more overtly appreciative than they had been before-they were, after all, there because they wanted to be rather than because they were expected to be. Given musicians' attentiveness to the reactions of their audiences, this may have been enough to engender a perception that their orchestras were, in fact, improving musically. Conclusion East German orchestras exhibited remarkable stability and continuity with their traditions despite two radical changes in the country's political-economic system. This finding provides additional evidence of the power of institutional processes to foster continuity even under conditions of revolutionary change (Skocpol, 1976) . The answer to our second research question, then, is that the two major political-economic changes only modestly affected orchestral functioning and the life and work of players.
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Symphony Orchestras The homogeneity that was observed during the socialist period was overdetermined. Beyond institutional forces, the pervasive administrative and economic control of orchestras made it virtually impossible for any but a very few international "showcase" ensembles to chart their own futures or to differentiate themselves from others in their state-specified class. When the socialist regime and its regulatory agencies collapsed in 1990, orchestras' latitude to manage themselves increased dramatically, even as their financial security disappeared. Our data show a modest overall improvement in orchestra functioning during this period (Table 5 ). But we also found that some orchestras were adapting much more successfully to their new opportunities and challenges than were others. We turn next to analysis of the reasons why.
RESULTS III: ADAPTATION PROCESSES
We address our third research question by drawing on survey, interview, and observational data to identify the factors that distinguish those East German orchestras that fared relatively well under reunification from those whose survival became increasingly uncertain. Our field observations pointed to two factors, one structural and one behavioral, as likely moderators of orchestras' post-reunification well-being: (a) an orchestra's prior standing as a major vs. regional ensemble and (b) the number and kinds of leadership initiatives taken by orchestra leaders and players. We examine these two moderators separately and then show how their joint effects set in motion, for some orchestras, self-fueling spirals of increasing (or decreasing) viability.
Orchestra Standing
The political-economic events of 1990-1991 had quite different consequences for major and regional orchestras. As is seen in Figure 1 and Table 5 , all statistically reliable interactions between time and standing have to do with the orchestras' organizational features, and four of the five carry the same message: that higher-standing orchestras were getting stronger and lower-standing orchestras were getting weaker as the events of reunification unfolded. This pattern is found for integrity as an ensemble, for player involvement and opportunities, for performance-contingent recognition, and for fair and effective recruitment processes. It is noteworthy that the measures for which the gap between major and regional orchestras widened are those for which, in 1990, East German means were relatively high (Table 4) . This suggests that reunification of the German state risked compromising some of the special strengths of the many smaller orchestras that had been dispersed so densely throughout the nation.
Leader Initiatives
We measured three aspects of music director behavior: direction-setting, taking organizational initiatives, and coaching (see the Appendix for the specific behaviors assessed). The significant time-by-standing interaction found for music director organizational initiatives exhibits a pattern complementary to that of the other significant interactions shown in Figure 1 . In 1990, the music directors of regional orchestras were taking more initiatives to improve the structure and functioning of their orchestras than were their counterparts in major orchestras. A year later, however, those differences had disappeared. Conductors of regional orchestras were giving less attention to organizational matters than they had before, and those of major orchestras were making more organizational changes than previously, a pattern consistent both with the widening gap between major and regional orchestras on other measures and with our on-site observations.
To further analyze how leader behavior moderated the impact of reunification, we calculated the difference in the level of organizational initiatives taken by music directors between 1990 and 1991, using data from players who described their leaders both years, and then correlated that difference with our dependent measures. Results are shown in Table 6 . 1991; orchestra-level correlations were computed using average player scores for each of the 20 orchestras for which data were available both years.
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Increased organizational initiatives by music directors were associated with improvements in several organizational features: greater player involvement and opportunities, improved recruitment processes, and greater integrity of the orchestra as a musical ensemble. Change in conductor initiatives was negatively associated with the centrality of sections to the orchestra's work (ameasure not discussed elsewhere in this report), suggesting that conductors' actions focused on consolidation of the orchestra as a whole. Significant effects also were obtained for player satisfaction with management, with work relationships, and with growth opportunities. These are precisely the kinds of affective changes that one would expect to find in an orchestra in which the music director had expanded players' opportunities, improved recruitment processes, and strengthened the orchestra as an ensemble-as the music directors of these orchestras had done.
The measures that did not covary with music director organizational initiatives also are informative: orchestra task and composition, adequacy of resources, work motivation and involvement, and all four indicators of orchestral processes and performance. The data reported in Table 6 , although correlational and therefore open to alternative interpretations, do suggest that when conductors responded to the events of reunification by focussing their energies on aspects of the organization over which they had direct and immediate control, players subsequently expressed greater satisfaction about those same matters-but not about others.
Change of Leadership
Six of the 21 orchestras in our sample changed music directors between 1990 and 1991, and seven of them changed technical directors. How did these orchestras fare relative to those whose former leaders remained in place? As shown in Table 7 , orchestras that changed music directors scored significantly lower on three indicators of financial and organizational well-being than did orchestras that did not change conductors; orchestras that changed technical directors scored lower on almost all of the measures having to do with organizational design.
It is tempting to conclude from these findings that replacing leaders during a period of radical environmental change invites disaster-an interpretation that would fit well with the population ecology perspective on organizational change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . In this case, however, the opposite conclusion is more tenable. Our observational data show that orchestras in which leadership changes were made (often at the initiative of players, who hoped that new leaders would make things better) were those that had been in especially poor shape as organizations prior to reunification. Although it no doubt is true that leader behavior makes more of a difference during major organizational reorientations than during periods of stability (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) , the improvements East German players hoped for, if ever they were to come, were not yet evident when we collected follow-up data on their orchestras in 1991. 
Player Initiatives
To further explore the role of players in shaping the post-reunification prospects of East German orchestras, we turned to our observational data to identify eight orchestras in which players took significant leadership initiatives between 1990 and 1991. As shown in Table 8 , those eight orchestras were significantly lower on many of our measures than were the thirteen orchestras in which players did not take organizational initiatives. This finding adds credence to the interpretation that players more often take action in orchestras with serious problems than in those that are in relatively good shape. And it is organizational difficulties that are especially likely to incite players: Orchestras in which players took leadership initiatives scored significantly lower on six of our seven measures of organizational features, but on only three of the twelve measures in other domains.
That the consequences of players taking control of their orchestras varied from orchestra to orchestra is illustrated by the following two cases. In a middle-size ensemble near a large city, players fired their music director just as soon as the collapsing political system made it possible to do so. As a replacement, they chose a very young conductor experienced in the ways of Western orchestras. They gave him a short-term contract, keeping other candidates on hold, so they could assess his performance before confirming the appointment-which, after a year and a half, they did. At this writing, the new music director is firmly in control and the orchestra is prospering.
Players in another orchestra, located in a small community near a resort area, were less successful. With the cooperation of the town mayor, who wanted a fine orchestra that would draw tourists and thereby help the local economy, they fired both the music director and the technical director. A famous conductor from another country 359/ASQ, September 1996 was hired who, together with the new technical director, decided to radically reduce the orchestra's size. That decision was poorly received by players and the already-shaky situation of the orchestra deteriorated even further. Perhaps the new leaders' decisions will turn out to promote the long-term best interest of the community, the orchestra, and the players. The short-term consequences, however, were described by players-whose actions had set the change process in motion-as decidedly negative.
Conclusion
Our findings point to a significant difference in the ability of major and regional orchestras to adapt to the challenges and opportunities posed by reunification. Major orchestras, which were already relatively strong and well financed, became even more so, giving them influence and opportunities that in other countries are accorded only to a few "star" orchestras. Regional orchestras continued to exist, but they risked losing their special prestige as the orchestras of the people, along with many of the material resources they needed to accomplish their musical work.
Orchestra leadership also clearly moderated the impact of reunification on East German orchestras, in two contrasting ways. On the one hand, leadership initiatives by music directors that addressed organizational features of orchestras were associated with favorable player reports about both orchestra properties and their own satisfaction. These 360/ASQ, September 1996 findings, although correlational, support the proposition that competent leadership can significantly help organizations adapt to exogenous shocks. On the other hand, leadership initiatives by players-which often included replacement of existing leaders with others of their own choosing-occurred mainly in orchestras that already were troubled-and such initiatives were by no means certain to improve either orchestra health or player well-being. How are these two findings to be reconciled? We hypothesize that the degree to which leadership initiatives are helpful to an organization in responding to an environmental shock depends on the prior health of the organization as a social system. When a shock hits an organization that is already strong, members are unlikely either to replace their leaders or to take significant leadership initiatives themselves. In this case, competent leadership (indexed here as increased organizational initiatives by existing leaders) is likely to aid adaptation to the exogenous event (Table 6 ). The situation is reversed, however, when a shock hits an organization that already is dysfunctional. Members of such organizations are more likely to replace existing leaders and/or to take over the leadership of the enterprise than are members of stronger organizations (Tables 7 and 8 Although these changes generated uncertainty and threat for East German orchestras, they also invited adaptive responses. Success was by no means assured, however, because both a proactive orientation and management skill were required, and these were qualities that had atrophied for many orchestras during their four decades under state socialism. Our findings show that major orchestras were far better positioned than regional orchestras to take advantage of the situation in 1991. Both the staffing of major orchestras and their recent histories contributed to their ability to respond competently to the threats and the opportunities that accompanied reunification. The structure of these orchestras more closely approximated the international standard, and their managers generally were better qualified and more knowledgeable than those of regional orchestras. Moreover, the top orchestras in East Germany had toured internationally and produced commercial recordings, activities that increased their knowledge of the orchestral world outside their own country. When the time came to take action, therefore, these orchestras were more disposed to act, and they had a greater capability to do so competently.
The Acuity of Conceptual Lenses
Our findings suggest that different conceptual paradigms are differentially useful for examining organization-environment relations, depending on the nature of the environmental changes that are occurring (Tolbert, 1985 When, on the other hand, environmental changes increase both resource contingencies and operational autonomy, then adaptation models provide especially useful analytic lenses. In our data, such models apply in the period after the fall of state socialism, when there was both need for action (because resources became increasingly contingent on what orchestras did and did not do) and the opportunity to take it (because external agencies no longer dictated to orchestras or constrained their choices).
Some orchestras responded to the threat posed by reunification with inaction or even retrenchment; others exhibited proactive and innovative responses. Our data show that the more proactive strategy, when done with competence, sharply differentiated those orchestras that prospered in the new context from those whose survival began to come into question. It is noteworthy that the actions taken by the most successful orchestras were oriented simultaneously internally, toward increased efficiency and better alignment with the new contextual realities, as would be predicted by rational adaptation models, and externally, in securing funding and new performance venues, as would be predicted by the resource dependency paradigm.
The two historical periods represented by our data fill the diagonal cells of a 2 x 2 matrix defined by resource contingency and operational autonomy, as depicted in Figure  2 . East German orchestras were low on both dimensions during state socialism and became high on both as the reunification process began to unfold. We can speculate, as well, on the two off-diagonal cells, even though our data do not provide information on them. Consider, first, a situation in which environmental changes result in high resource contingency but low operational autonomy. and members can do pretty much whatever they wish, and neither positive nor negative consequences will return from their environments. If resources become increasingly munificent, the organization may perform quite well; if they become increasingly scarce, it may do poorly.
Models of attributional processes may be more germane to such situations than theories of organization-environment relations. In both of the cases just described, for example, members may erroneously attribute the outcomes they obtain to the actions they have taken (March, 1981 ; Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986). Such attributional errors can be dangerous. An organization that is inefficient and overstaffed, for example, may remain that way (or even grow larger and more cumbersome) if decision makers erroneously conclude that it is their actions that have generated the positive outcomes that are returning from the munificent but noncontingent environment. Similarly, leaders of an organization that is doing poorly in a noncontingent but resource-poor environment may initiate organizational changes that accomplish nothing other than to create additional threat and uncertainty within the enterprise.
The entries in the matrix in Figure 2 summarize our overall findings about the times and circumstances under which institutional dynamics, ecological processes, and organizational adaptation dominate responses to significant societal-level change. Taken as a whole, the findings fit well with the punctuated equilibrium view of system change processes (Miller and Friesen, 1984: chap. 8; Astley, 1985; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Gersick, 1991) . These theorists follow the lead of contemporary evolutionary biology in viewing organizations as generally being in a state of quasi-stationary equilibrium that occasionally is punctuated by periods of rapid, fundamental, and multidimensional change (Gould, 1980: chap. 17; 1989) . Only when the deep structures of a system become dismantled, it is argued, is fundamental change likely to occur (Gersick, 1 991 ).
